

THE SCROLL



HISTORY RESEARCH JOURNAL

VOLUME II

ISSUE I

About

The Scroll is the undergraduate historical journal of the University of Southern California's Phi Alpha Theta chapter. The journal seeks to promote student authorship of and engagement with high quality historical writing. There are two editions per year, one published each semester. After publication, The Scroll invites the edition's student authors to present at The Scroll Unrolled conference, giving students valuable experience presenting their original research.

Editorial Board

Editor in Chief

Noah Hellum '21

Managing Editor

Connor Brown '22

Editors

Lucy Sun '21

Ava Luthin '22

Mallory Novicoff '22

Tommy Nguyen '22

Chris Aranda '22

Sean Silvia '22

Himani Boompally '23

Rachel Heil '23

Faculty Advisory Board

Dr. Wolf Gruner, Shapell-Guerin Chair in Jewish Studies and
Professor of History

Dr. Kyung Moon Hwang, Professor of History and East Asian
Languages and Cultures

Dr. Ketaki Pant, Assistant Professor of History

Dr. Nathan Perl-Rosenthal, Associate Professor of History, Spatial Sci-
ences and Law

Dr. Lindsay O'Neill, Associate Professor of History; Director of Under-
graduate Studies for History

Dr. Aro Velvet, Assistant Professor of History

Editor's Note

Dear Reader,

Welcome to the second spring issue of *The Scroll*. In this edition, we are excited to feature three fascinating articles that span broad ranges of time and geography. Serving as a timely opening act, Joseph Cho's "The Compatibility of Religion and Medicine during the Great Plague of London" expertly addresses the relationship between seventeenth-century religious figures and medical professionals by analyzing an array of broadsides and medical pamphlets. Samantha Lee will transport you from the urban sprawl of London to the smoke-filled offices of American newspapers in "American Journalism in Southeast Asia: Comparing U.S. Media Coverage and Public Reaction to the Vietnam War Versus the Cambodian Genocide, 1970-1989" where she adds to the historical study of the media's influence on public affairs. Next, Luis Rodriguez-Perez's "Family Matters in Providence Island: Sex Politics and Problems in Peopling a Puritan Colony, 1629-1635" depicts the struggle between colonists of Providence Island and the businessmen of the Providence Island Company over the definition of family structures and the role of women in the transatlantic world. Concluding the issue, our editor Christopher Aranda interviews Dr. Anne Goldgar on the technical intricacies of microhistories and her acclaimed scholarship on tulip mania.

This issue marks the beginning of our journal's second volume. In most years, a new volume would simply be a reminder to change the number on our issue's spine. This year, however, a new volume means much more. It means hope. Hope that we will be strengthened by the resilience forged from the past year. Hope that we will find new authors and editors who infuse the journal with their unique passions and expertise. Hope that we will soon be sitting together again in SOS 250, debating history, not over Zoom, but over snacks from Trader Joe's. I cannot wait to see what this new journey brings for *The Scroll*. I hope you come along with us.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Noah Heller", followed by a long horizontal flourish line.

Editor in Chief at *The Scroll*

Table of Contents

- | | | |
|----|--|--------|
| 1. | The Compatibility of Religion and Medicine during the Great Plague of London
Joseph Cho '22 | pg. 6 |
| 2. | American Journalism in Southeast Asia: Comparing U.S. Media Coverage and Public Reaction to the Vietnam War Versus the Cambodian Genocide, 1970-1989
Samantha Lee '22 | pg. 28 |
| 3. | Family Matters in Providence Island: Sex Politics and Problems in Peopling a Puritan Colony, 1629-1635
Luis Rodriguez-Perez '21 | pg. 49 |
| 4. | An Interview with Dr. Anne Goldgar on Microhistories and Tulip Mania
Christopher Aranda '22 | pg. 62 |

The Compatibility of Religion and Medicine during the Great Plague of London

By: Joseph Cho '22

From 1665 to 1666, the Great Plague of London killed at least 60,000 people, forcing the various sectors of London society to devise effective responses. Medical authorities prescribed remedies and preventative measures and assisted the government with plague containment policies, such as bans on public gatherings. Christian authorities raised morale by offering spiritual guidance, delivering instruction through broadsides, ironically holding public services and fasts to ask for divine deliverance. Given these seemingly conflicting stances on public religious gatherings, how did the physicians and clergy of London view and affirm the validity of each other's advice? Sermons and medical publications published during the plague, as well as secondary sources about the Great Plague, suggest that London's Christian and medical sectors deemed each other's plague responses as fairly complementary to their own. Contemporary theories of plague and religious doctrine on medical legitimacy affirmed that religious and medical assistance were mutually compatible. As a result, clergy exhorted their congregations to obey doctors' orders, and physicians built their prescriptions around religious beliefs and gatherings. Of course, the denominational divisions within London's Christian community deeply complicated medical-clerical relations. Non-Anglican clergy critiqued the physicians' actions and asserted that Christian spirituality offered superior assistance. Despite this nuance, the urgency of fighting the plague ensured that London's Anglican clergy and physicians accommodated each other's guidance.

Background

The Great Plague of London took place in the midst of an incredibly volatile climate of religious and political upheaval. Historian Alanson Lloyd Moote and microbiologist Dorothy Moote explain in *The Great Plague: The Story of London's Most Deadly Year* that England was in the midst of decades-long conflict between the Stuart monarchy and religious

7 Compatibility of Religion and Medicine

dissidents.¹ Political upheaval began in 1642, when the Puritan sect, led by Oliver Cromwell, launched a six-year civil war against the reigning monarch, Charles I. After defeating the royalist armies in 1648, the Puritans executed Charles I and established their faith as the official religion, abolishing the Anglican state church. The displaced Anglican royalists plotted to regain power; once Cromwell's death unravelled Puritan rule, they invited the Stuart heir to assume kingship over England as Charles II. Charles II reinstated the Anglican Church as the state religion and banned all other worship services, netting opposition from the Puritans and other religious dissenters. While the range of faiths represented by dissenters was myriad, this paper will group them together under the term "nonconformists." The restoration of the Stuart monarchy, the culmination of decades of religious warfare, was only five years removed from the Great Plague of London.

In the midst of this turbulent socio-political environment, the compatibility of the clergy's and physicians' plague responses partially rested on their understanding of how bubonic plague began and spread. Scholar Mary Lindemann, a widely-acclaimed expert on the history of early modern Europe and the history of medicine, provides much insight on scientific theories surrounding plague's origins. Her work *Medicine and Society in Early Modern Europe* finds that a combination of two theories framed medical knowledge of the plague: the contagion theory and miasma theory. The contagion theory posited that "diseases are passed from person to person, either directly or through water, air, or inanimate objects."² It offered little explanation beyond this rough definition, failing to specify through which means the bubonic plague spread. Despite its vagueness, the contagion theory's assertion that people spread disease went unquestioned by the public, forming the basis of containment policies such as quarantine. In contrast, the miasma theory posited that miasmas, or corrupt air, caused illness. Possible causes of miasma were environmental factors such as filth

¹ Dorothy and Lloyd A. Moote, *The Great Plague: The Story of London's Most Deadly Year*, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.

² Mary Lindemann. *Medicine and Society in Early Modern Europe*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 177.

and decay, sick people, or even swamps. While the miasma theory failed to clarify how exactly miasma impacted the human body, it did lead to initiatives to clear filth from the streets, fumigate buildings, and relocate burials away from buildings. Given that neither the contagionist nor miasmist views provided a perfect explanation for the bubonic plague's spread, most medical professionals and plague responses combined the contagionist and miasmist views. Moote and Moote observe that influential physician William Boghurst theorized that toxic wind brought the plague to London, and contagion spread it. Boghurst added that "especially susceptible to the miasmas were people who had engaged in disorderly living, overeating, and excessive physical exertion (including sex)."³ It is notable that the miasmist focus on environmental corruption translated well into discussions about moral corruption, on which the religious sector offered plenty of commentary. The medical sector's inability to narrow the plague's roots to one specific cause ultimately provided ample opportunity for London's Christian authorities to fill in the gaps. Anticipating this, they built their prescriptions with religious practice in mind.

Physicians' Affirmation of the Religious Sector's Legitimacy

To this end, London's physicians appropriated the Bible to position themselves within a Christian worldview. In 1665, physician Thomas Wharton published "Directions for the prevention and cure of the plague," which offered advice for partaking in religious activity safely. His title page includes the biblical quotation "For FEAR is nothing else but a Betraying of those Succours which Reason offereth."⁴ Of course, Wharton could have simply quoted the Bible performatively; however, the deep embedding of Christianity into early modern English culture suggests that Wharton would have had sufficient cause to be literate in Christian scriptures and traditions. Moreover, the verse's position near the front of the document suggests that he intended for these dual meanings to interact. The

³ Dorothy and Lloyd A. Moote, *The Great Plague: The Story of London's Most Deadly Year*, p. 70.

⁴ Thomas Warton, "Directions for the prevention and cure of the plague Fitted for the poorer sort", unpaginated.

9 Compatibility of Religion and Medicine

implication is that God offers freedom from fear of sickness through Wharton's prescriptions; all the readers need to do is to follow directions. In addition to quoting Bible verses, physicians explicitly claimed divine sanction. Another medical treatise, William Simpson's "Zenexton ante-pestilentiale," frames physicians and their medical assistance as an extension of the will of God. In his preface, he quotes a Bible verse from a book of wisdom claiming that God created medicines and physicians to bring healing, so people should not avoid them.⁵ He also alludes to the theological concept of stewardship, asserting that God gave him medical knowledge to share with others for the public good. No information is available on Simpson's background, so it is impossible to verify whether his Biblical interpretation stems from genuine conviction. Nonetheless, Simpson's usage of the Bible suggests that despite having their own theories of plague, physicians positioned themselves within, not opposed to, a Christian framework. By using religious justifications, they stood a better chance of building rapport with their clients.

Using biblical justifications like those in Simpson's treatise, physicians framed themselves as co-belligerents with Christian authorities fighting against the common enemy of the plague. In 1665, physician Richard Barker published "Consilium anti-pestilentiale," in which he concedes that the plague has spiritual causes but reminds readers that physicians can help bring about God's mercy. In doing so, he positions the work of physicians within the Christian phenomenon of judgment, asserting that physical assistance is a proper response to a spiritual issue. This usage of Christian language is not entirely self-serving; he does acknowledge the validity of the clergy's work. He charges "both Divines and those of our Profession"⁶ to procure God's mercy, "all according to our several stations and sphears of activity." Barker's juxtaposition of clergy and physicians indicates a belief that both groups are effectively striving for the same goal. By aligning their interests, he ascribes equal importance to

⁵ William Simpson, "Zenexton ante-pestilentiale," unpaginated.

⁶ Richard Barker, "Consilium anti-pestilentiale.; Seasonable advice concerning sure, safe, specifick, and experimented medicines both for the preservation from, and cure of, this present plague," unpaginated.

the clergy as he would to his fellow physicians. Given that Barker addressed his treatise towards the city's Lord Mayor and aldermen, his rhetoric had real-world implications on how the government would esteem Christian authorities. To be sure, Barker's words would not have translated into advocacy for the religious sector; his first priority was institutionalizing medical assistance. However, his presentation of the clergy and physicians as a united front would at the very least forestall conflict between the two groups, if not rule out restrictions on religious activity altogether. In this way, Barker's treatise positioned medical and religious assistance as having equal legitimacy.

Physicians also accommodated religious beliefs by incorporating religious practices into their recommendations. The Great Plague saw the reprinting of the College of Physicians' "The Kings medicines for the plague," which in addition to traditional medical remedies also prescribes multiple prayers that involve admitting sin and pleading for God's mercy. This gesture appears to be genuine; the messages propagated by those prayers are largely continuous with the Christian perspective that the plague was God's judgment for London's sin. The document's title ends with "to be used all England over," and its materiality strongly suggests this conclusion. The typeface and illustrations are crudely printed, and the low line height compresses the content together. This is abundantly clear in the document's second page: the entire right side is smudged with ink, and it is impossible to discern what the woodcuts on the header are supposed to represent. These are the hallmarks of cheap production, which was typical for documents produced for mass distribution. It is reasonable to assume that the College of Physicians was using its influence to promote prayer as a legitimate plague response. It was uniquely situated to do so; the College was England's highest governing body of medical professionals. The College of Physicians' wide dissemination of the prayers would have signaled to the physician community that medicine and religion warranted equal levels of validity. Throughout the Great Plague of London, London's medical establishment pursued a collaborative relationship with their clerical counterparts.

11 Compatibility of Religion and Medicine

Most importantly, London's physicians did not call for a moratorium on religious gatherings, opting instead to propose safety measures. Given that the contagionist view would have called for an end to all in-person activity, the physicians used the miasmist view to remove sources of corrupt air from churches. The plague period saw the reprinting of the late physician Francis Herring's "Preservatives against the plague," which suggests the creation of a separate resting place for plague victims, because their burial in church graveyards would "be very dangerous for spreading the contagion and poisoning the whole Citie."⁷ It is especially notable that his reasoning includes the clause that "the chiefe Magistrates of the Citie, and many other Citizens meete weekly to heare sermons." Herring viewed church attendance as an immutable fact of life, preferring to adapt to, rather than change, the situation. Underlying this perspective was the worldview that plague had both physical and spiritual causes. While Herring focused on offering practical solutions, he did claim that plague was a punishment from God, an attitude unanimously held by early modern English society.⁸ He would have been supportive of churchgoing; perhaps moral instruction would prevent further punishments. While Herring died in 1628, his high position in the College of Physicians would have influenced organizational decision-making. Herring's ideology would have surely trickled down to the physicians working at the time of the Great Plague.

Even physicians without explicit religious ties were similarly accommodating of church services. Wharton's "Directions for the prevention and cure of the plague" recommends that parishioners who have fasted should ingest something before going to church and that churches should burn brimstone or tar inside half an hour before the start of services. He also echoes Herring's recommendation to bury plague victims away from churches. Wharton's prescriptions speak to the continuity of Herring's ideology in the physician community, especially when

⁷ Francis Herring, "Certain rules, directions or advertisements for this time of pestilentiall contagion; Preservatives against the plague.; Directions & advertisements for this time of pestilentiall contagion," p. 4.

⁸ Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, s.v. "Herring, Francis."

considering Wharton's lack of confirmed religious ties. Aside from a few passing references to God, little evidence of his specific persuasion exists. His lack of an explicitly Christian worldview does manifest in his suggested modification to plague fasting: Wharton did believe that certain aspects of Christian spirituality could stand to change in light of the plague. However, Wharton is largely tolerant of in-person religious activity, which suggests that this attitude stemmed from established medical practice. Wharton's prescriptions therefore confirm mainstream medicine's acceptance of religious gatherings.

Clergy's Affirmation of the Medical Sector's Legitimacy

In turn, the Christian authorities' faith-based response did offer a different explanation for the plague but largely affirmed the legitimacy of medical assistance. As Lindemann previously illuminated, Christians believed that the bubonic plague was a judgment sent by God to punish humanity's sin. Embodying this perspective is the broadside ballad "Lord have mercy upon us," which claims that God sent the plague "to cite us Unto Repentance, and from sin to fright us."⁹ If disobeying God caused the plague, then returning to God and making amends would remove it. While the ballad's authorship is unknown, Lindemann clarifies that this perspective was actually very common among the clergy. According to her, this interpretation of the plague as judgment influenced cities to turn to private and public prayers of repentance. Lindemann cites London's response to a previous plague in 1636, which involved mass distribution of a prayer pamphlet and the proclamation of a general fast nationwide. At first glance, the church's attribution to spiritual causes appears to conflict with the physicians' scientific theories. It may even prompt the question of whether using medicine to avoid divine sanction would be folly, if not sacrilege. However, Lindemann finds that religious acceptance of the importance of medicine was commonplace by 1500. She asserts that people accepted the idea that plague had natural and supernatural causes, and

⁹ Unknown, "Lord Have Mercy Upon Us," unpaginated.

13 Compatibility of Religion and Medicine

they sought both natural and supernatural cures accordingly. To this end, the clergy, while upholding the “plague as judgment” worldview, strongly encouraged their congregations to seek medical help.

One way London’s clergy added to the medical sector’s legitimacy was to vocally affirm that God blessed medicine-based responses to the plague. In 1665, clergyman John Featley printed “A divine antidote against the plague,” in which he reflects on God’s mercies during the plague. He remarks that God afflicted the Israelites of the Bible more harshly, claiming that “To our Physitians he giveth [knowledge]: to our Medicines he give virtue. The Herbs of the fields, and the Fruits of the trees, and flesh of the beasts do yet offer the selves for our cure.”¹⁰ Featley’s word choice is based on the underlying assumption that God blesses the work of physicians and medicine. Aside from the modification that God actively intervenes throughout the healing process (as opposed to the claim that God simply ordains it), this quote largely echoes physicians’ claims of divine sanction. The plague years also saw the reprinting of Calvinist theologian Theodore Beza’s 16th century work “A learned treatise of the plague,” which argues that “as therefore God hath appointed some which shall not die of the Plague, so also hath he appointed Remedies, by which, so far as in them lieth, men may avoid the Plague.”¹¹ Beza would have known that the Bible uses the word “appointed” to describe serious matters of destiny; his diction therefore suggests the alignment of medical assistance with God’s will.¹² Beza also affirms the contagion theory, using it as a basis for considering flight from London “among the chief remedies and provisions in Physick against Infection.”¹³ Ultimately, the strength of Beza’s work is

¹⁰ John Featley, “A divine antidote against the plague; or Mourning teares, in soliloquies and prayers As, 1. For this general visitation. 2. For those whose houses are shut up of the plague. 3. For those who have risings or swellings. 4. For those marked with the tokens. Necessary for all families as well in the country as in the city, in this time of pestilence. By John Featley, chaplain to His late Majesty,” p. 50.

¹¹ Theodore Beza, “A learned treatise of the plague wherein the two questions, whether the plague be infectious or no, and , whether and how farr it may be shunned of Christians by going aside, are resolved,” p. 9.

¹² For use of word “appointed” in Bible, see Ex 9:5, Jer 8:7, Jer 33:25, Mt. 28:17

¹³ Theodore Beza, “A learned treatise of the plague wherein the two questions, whether the plague be infectious or no, and , whether and how farr it may be shunned of Christians by going aside, are resolved,” p. 9.

not so much his argumentation but his ethos. Beza was John Calvin's successor, and his work solidified Calvinism's presence in Europe. As a result, the republication of Beza's work functions as an intentional attempt to reach out to London's Calvinist communities. In this way, Christian authorities sought to convince their communities that medical advice and treatments were a biblical response to the plague.

In addition to biblical reinterpretation, religious messages also connected audiences to medicinal treatments. The aforementioned broadside ballad "Lord have mercy upon us" places home remedies directly under the heading, describing them as "certain approved Medicines for the Plague."¹⁴ It is unclear if the writers or any established medical authorities offered this approval, but the message is clear: the writers endorsed the following treatments. The broadside ballad's materiality suggests that this endorsement was meant to reach the general public. The page's content is crammed into thin columns; the sheer lack of whitespace is likely a measure taken to maximize content and minimize production costs. The illustrations, although more textured than most, do not possess the rigorous attention to detail expected of an engraving in a book for wealthier audiences. In addition, ink smudges blur the lettering's sharpness, suggesting that print quality was deemphasized beyond ensuring a baseline level of readability. Altogether, these details strongly suggest that the writers wanted to reach a large low-income audience. Addressing common people directly would have extended the reach of religious messages; a ballad was far easier to understand (and more entertaining) than a Sunday morning sermon. The church thus took measures not only to promote medicine but also to ensure its promotions were as engaging and far-reaching as possible.

Some clergy even sought to dispel preconceptions about medical theories. In 1666, minister Josiah Hunter delivered the sermon "The dreadfulness of the plague," in which he denounced the claim that the plague is not infectious because the angels caused it. To prove the reality of

¹⁴ Unknown, "Lord Have Mercy Upon Us," unpaginated.

contagion, Hunter not only discusses historical counterexamples but also claims he will “leave the proving of the Plagues infection to the Physitian.”¹⁵ This clause indicates that Hunter lays no claim to expertise on the plague, affirming the medical authority of the physicians. Hunter continues to reject plague attributions that fail to accommodate scientific perspectives, arguing that “for to say that the Plague [befalls] none but such as want faith to rely upon and trust in the Providence of God is [an] error more bloudy than to say, that it is not [infectious].” Moreover, Hunter uses the sermon’s rhetorical situation to amplify his message. The title indicates that he delivered it on a day of public fasting, and the attendees would have likely elevated spiritual remedies over medical assistance. Hunter’s sermon thus exemplifies how London’s clergy used argumentation and other rhetorical tactics to convince Londoners that physicians were reputable authorities for understanding the plague.

Christian authorities did not limit their affirmation of the medical sector to rhetoric; they also adopted new practices and responsibilities to adjust to medical realities. While churches continued to hold regular services, they were cognizant that religious gatherings could potentially spread the plague. Plague historian Walter George Bell reports that churches took safety measures, such as changing service times and employing guards, to limit the likelihood of an infected person entering.¹⁶ While these policies are not the same as the physicians’ aforementioned recommendations, they are concrete evidence that Christian authorities took medical theories seriously enough to take action on them. The only reason why churches did not halt religious services was that it was impossible to provide adequate spiritual guidance without them. In addition, parishes took on the responsibility of coordinating local plague responses. Moote and Moote found that churchwardens and other parish officials handled administrative duties, selecting front-line nurses and paying out wages. Their work was so integral that “the loss of a parish’s two

¹⁵ Josiah Hunter, “The dreadfulness of the plague,” p. 4.

¹⁶ Walter George Bell, *The Great Plague in London in 1665*, p. 221

churchwardens, however, was nearly a catastrophe.”¹⁷ By actively collaborating with medical workers, churches implicitly portrayed their moral support of the medical sector as an extension of their purpose. London’s Christian authorities appear to have taken their pro-medicine rhetoric seriously, supporting their words with concrete actions.

Nonconforming Christians’ Opposition to the Medical Sector

English Christianity was hardly monolithic; this heavily complicated the relationship between London’s religious and medical sectors. The Christians who were most supportive of physicians were part of the Church of England; England’s Christian ecosystem, however, also included those who were not part of the Church, or nonconformists. Throughout the 17th century, these factions jockeyed for influence; once in power, they would marginalize the others. Moote and Moote find that the Anglicans quickly legislated restrictions against non-conforming Protestants, including a ban on nonconforming pastors living within five miles of any city.¹⁸ They elaborate that during the Great Plague of London, the state continued to suppress non-conformists, frequently raiding their religious gatherings. The plague consequently became another chapter in the power struggle between Anglican state power and nonconformist dissidents. Given that physicians cooperated with the state to form their plague response, their religious critics were mostly (but not always) nonconformists. Critiquing physicians was risky business; in 1603, Calvinist minister Henoah Clapham received prison time for his assertion that Christianity and medical theories of plague were incompatible.¹⁹ As a result, safely criticizing physicians’ actions required subtlety or anonymity; investigating nonconformist critiques requires identifying and interpreting heavily coded language. Ultimately, nonconformists’ opposition towards physicians strongly suggests that whether Christian authorities affirmed the medical sector’s legitimacy depended on their relationship to the government.

¹⁷ Dorothy and Lloyd A. Moote, *The Great Plague: The Story of London's Most Deadly Year*, p. 229.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 211.

¹⁹ Paula Basseoto, "Ideological Uses of Medical Discourses in Early Modern English Plague Writing," p. 15.

One tactic nonconformists used to critique physicians was to claim that the Christian view of plague superseded dominant medical theories. Independent preacher Thomas Brooks described the plague as “God’s Arrow” and claimed that “none can pull [it] out but God himself,” implying that physicians were powerless to provide healing.²⁰ Moreover, he describes physicians espousing miasmist theories as “Physitians of no value, that cannot look above second causes, to the First Cause.”²¹ By portraying the physicians’ worldview as shortsighted, Brooks seeks to delegitimize them altogether. Brooks’ conclusions are initially surprising, especially because his medical counterparts concurred with him that God’s judgment caused the plague. However, a deeper examination of Brooks’ historical context implies that his treatise is part of the larger conflict between Anglicans and nonconformists. Brooks used his ministry to support the previous Calvinist government, preach a thanksgiving sermon to celebrate a Calvinist military victory and answer a summons to spread Protestantism to Ireland in 1652.²² The Restoration would have significantly curbed his religious influence, giving Brooks much incentive to criticize any and all agents of the state. In asserting religious superiority over London’s physicians, Brooks was also attempting to upstage the authority of the English government and thus his Anglican rivals. Brooks’ rhetoric illuminates nonconformist contempt towards the scientific and political authority wielded by physicians.

Proponents of this view also claimed that turning to God, not medicine, would bring healing from the plague. In 1665, Quaker George Whitehead delivered the sermon “No remission without repentance” to urge the people of London to emphasize spiritual responses to the plague. In doing so, he joins Brooks in claiming that London’s sin was the main cause of the plague. Whitehead also asserts that the plague will “never” leave London unless the people move from “bare Confessions” to a “real forsaking” of sin.²³ Whitehead’s sermon never mentioned medicine or even

²⁰ Thomas Brooks, “A Heavenly Cordial for all those Servants of the Lord that have Had the PLAGUE (and are Recovered) or that now Have it,” p. 2.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

²² Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, s.v. “Brooks, Thomas.”

²³ Whitehead, “No remission without repentance,” 5

physicians, but his absolutist language revealed that his paradigm of plague has no room for any other dimension than the spiritual. In doing so, he implies that physicians are less relevant than theology to discussions about the plague. Whitehead's rejection of (state-sponsored) physical interpretations of the plague appeared in his specific background of religious persecution. As a Quaker leader, Whitehead was a vocal opponent of the Restoration government's religious restrictions, leading protests in 1661.²⁴ The government appeared to have cracked down on him; he was arrested for preaching in 1664, facing an accusation of sedition in custody. Given his contentious relationship with the state, he would have likely viewed physicians and their contributions to plague policies as an extension of the government agents who already limited his religious freedom. In this light, Whitehead's dismissal of medical assistance implicitly functioned as a defense of Quakerism's validity and right to exist. Whitehead's sermon illustrates nonconformist efforts to establish their religious authority at the expense of physicians and the government.

Nonconformists also directly questioned the physicians' ability to provide physical healing. One of these clergymen was John Edwards, who in 1665 published the treatise "The Plague of the Heart." While he was ordained within the Church of England, he possessed "rigid high Calvinistic views," effectively rendering him a nonconformist.²⁵ In his treatise, Edwards lists "Quacks and Empricks enough in the world, who...know not how to cure [the disease]" alongside "Doctors who prescribe Physick, which leavs the Patient as sick as it found him" as examples of medical assistance gone wrong.²⁶ In doing so, he joins Brooks in asserting that Christian spirituality, not medicine, was the key to plague relief. Edwards' criticism that medical providers are unreliable does have some basis in fact; indeed, Moote and Moote openly question whether licensed physicians' limited medical knowledge provided them any real distinction from outright

²⁴ Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, s.v. "Whitehead, George."

²⁵ Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, s.v. "Edwards, John."

²⁶ John Edwards, "The plague of the heart its [brace] nature and quality, original and causes, signs and symptoms, prevention and cure : with directions for our behaviour under the present judgement and plague of the Almighty," p. 13.

frauds.²⁷ However, Edwards' usage of this criticism as a springboard to assert the superiority of spiritual assistance may imply the presence of a wider critique of the Church of England. As a Calvinist dissident, Edwards would have truly believed that the Anglican church's esteem of physicians disregarded God's sovereignty over humanity, a key Calvinist doctrine. Defending his Calvinist ideology would have been reason enough for Edwards to buck his denomination's endorsement of physicians. Thus, Edwards' critique further exemplifies how nonconformist aspersions against physicians' efficacy reflected their overall hostility towards the Anglican church and its state power.

Another way nonconformists asserted their authority at the expense of physicians was to chide those who had fled London during the plague. Given that very few physicians held contracts with the state or even long-term relationships with patients, physicians had few legal obligations to their communities.²⁸ As a result, many physicians fled London, much to the ire of certain Christian authorities. In the tract "The shepherds lasher lash'd," author J.B. argues that "when Doctors leave their patients, Priests their tasks, [is it] nothing to the Sheep [that] their shepherds leave them? [Is it] nothing to the sick, if Doctors deceive them?"²⁹ Likewise, the nameless author of "Londini lachrymæ" decries doctors who, "when they see Contagion in such force, Prescribe themselves, for Fear, Bills of Divorce," leaving "their Poor Patients Visited of God." While the anonymous nature of these complaints prevents any verification of their writers' religious identities, their multiple allusions to Biblical concepts strongly suggests that their tone is authentically Christian. Moreover, Christians who stayed in London during the plague and criticized those who fled stood to gain a vastly improved reputation. Bell reports that when many of their Anglican counterparts fled London, nonconformist clergy stepped in to fill the spiritual void.³⁰ These nonconformists were able to portray themselves as courageous and their Anglican rivals as cowardly,

²⁷ Dorothy and Lloyd A. Moote, *The Great Plague: The Story of London's Most Deadly Year*, p. 101.

²⁸ Patrick Wallis, "Plagues, Morality and the Place of Medicine in Early Modern England," p. 8.

²⁹ J.B., "The shepherds lasher lash'd," unpaginated.

³⁰ Walter George Bell, *The Great Plague in London in 1665*, p. 224-227

building a strong reputation for upstanding morality. In this way, religious critics of physicians were able to reinterpret flight from infected areas to boost their public perception.

Conclusion

The London physicians' and clergy's mutual endorsement of each other's legitimacy during the plague appears to be the product of two factors: scientific uncertainty about the origins of the plague and the dominance of Christianity in English discourse. The physicians simply did not have the proof necessary to challenge a religious explanation of the plague, and the religious climate rendered it prohibitively difficult to do so. It is small wonder that the physicians took the path of least resistance and framed their statements around a Christian worldview. Given that the clergy had no reason to feel threatened by the physicians, they were highly likely to reciprocate. In addition, the complication posed by nonconformist resistance to physicians suggests the existence of a third factor: religious policy. The Anglicans, who received state backing, were highly likely to cooperate with state-sanctioned physicians. The nonconformists, who experienced religious persecution, were more likely to view physicians' efforts as yet another power play by the royalist government. Altogether, these factors strongly suggest that Biblical doctrines played less of a role than religious conflict and contemporary scientific knowledge in determining clergy's and physicians' attitudes toward each other's

Ultimately, Christian and medical authorities during the Great Plague of London largely affirmed the other's validity, using sermons, plague manuals, broadsides, and other materials to spread their message. Their actions reinforced the public's paradigm in which the plague had physical and spiritual origins and solutions. While some Christian voices did question the qualifications of physicians, this was not so much motivated by a distrust of science as it was by the larger power struggle between the Anglican church and nonconformists. As physicians continued to develop and substantiate the contagion theory, English society began to weigh medical perspectives on the plague more heavily. Nonetheless, the mutually

21 Compatibility of Religion and Medicine

supportive relationship between London's medical and religious sectors in the face of pandemic remains a stunning display of solidarity, as well as a testament to the loftier influence of sociopolitical and religious circumstances of the time than questions about the validity of medicine and science.

Bibliography

- Anonymous. *Londini lachrymæ; or, London's complaint against her fugitives*. 1665. Early English Books Online.
- Anonymous. *London's Lord Have Mercy Upon Us*. 1665. English Broadside Ballad Archive.
- Barker, Richard. "Consilium anti-pestilentiale.; Seasonable advice concerning sure, safe, specifick, and experimented medicines both for the preservation from, and cure of, this present plague." 1665. Early English Books Online.
- Baseotto, Paula. "Ideological Uses of Medical Discourses in Early Modern English Plague Writing," *The Language of Medicine: Science, Practice, Academia*, 2015.
- Bell, Walter. *The Great Plague in London in 1665, by Walter George Bell. With Thirty Illustrations Comprising Contemporary Prints, Plans & Drawings*. England: John Lane; Dodd, Mead and company, 1924.
- Beza, Theodore. "A learned treatise of the plague wherein the two questions, whether the plague be infectious or no, and , whether and how farr it may be shunned of Christians by going aside, are resolved." 1665. Early English Books Online.
- Brooks, Thomas. "A Heavenly Cordial for all those Servants of the Lord that have Had the PLAGUE (and are Recovered) or that now Have it." 1666. Early English Books Online.
- Edwards, John. "The plague of the heart its [brace] nature and quality, original and causes, signs and symptoms, prevention and cure : with directions for our behaviour under the present judgement and plague of the Almighty." 1665. Early English Books Online.

23 Compatibility of Religion and Medicine

Encyclopedia Britannica, s.v. "Theodore Beza,"

<https://www.britannica.com/biography/Theodore-Beza>.

Featley, John. "A divine antidote against the plague; or Mourning teares, in soliloquies and prayers As, 1. For this general visitation. 2. For those whose houses are shut up of the plague. 3. For those who have risings or swellings. 4. For those marked with the tokens. Necessary for all families as well in the country as in the city, in this time of pestilence. By John Featley, chaplain to His late Majesty." 1665. Early English Books Online.

Herring, Francis. "Certain rules, directions or advertisements for this time of pestilentiall contagion; Preservatives against the plague.; Directions & advertisements for this time of pestilential contagion." 1665. Early English Books Online.

Hunter, Josiah. "The dreadfulness of the plague." 1666. Early English Books Online.

J.B. "The shepherds lasher lash'd, or A confutation of the fugitives vindication." 1665. Early English Books Online.

Lindemann, Mary. *Medicine and Society in Early Modern Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Moote, A. Lloyd and Moote, Dorothy. *The Great Plague: The Story of London's Most Deadly Year. The Great Plague*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006.

Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, s.v. "Brooks, Thomas,"

<https://www-oxforddnb-com.libproxy1.usc.edu/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-3567?rskey=b7FHsW&result=1>

Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, s.v. "Edwards, John,"

<https://www-oxforddnb-com.libproxy1.usc.edu/view/10.1093/ref:od>

nb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-8545?rskey=DpTDGj&result=2

Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, s.v. "Featley, John,"
<https://www-oxforddnb-com.libproxy1.usc.edu/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-9243?rskey=ULoxci&result=1>

Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, s.v. "Herring, Francis,"
<https://www-oxforddnb-com.libproxy1.usc.edu/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-13095?rskey=ETaoNF&result=1>

Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, s.v. "Jones, Thomas Wharton,"
<https://www-oxforddnb-com.libproxy1.usc.edu/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-37617?rskey=x5NtuR&result=1>

Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, s.v. "Whitehead, George,"
<https://www-oxforddnb-com.libproxy1.usc.edu/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-29287?rskey=h4uc90&result=1>

Royal College of Physicians of London. "The King's medicines for the plague Prescribed for the year, 1604. by the whole Collodge [sic] of Physitians, both spiritual and temporal. Generally made use of, and approved in the years, 1625, and 1636. And now most fitting for this dangerous time of infection, to be used all England over." 1665. Early English Books Online.

Simpson, William. "Zenexton ante-pestilential. Or, A short discourse of the plague its antidotes and cure, according to the placets of the best of physicians, Hippocrates, Paracelsus, and Helmont." 1665. Early English Books Online.

25 Compatibility of Religion and Medicine

Wallis, Patrick. "Plagues, Morality and the Place of Medicine in Early Modern England." *The English historical review* 121, no. 490 (February 1, 2006): 1–24.

Wharton, Thomas. "Directions for the prevention and cure of the plague Fitted for the poorer sort." 1665. Early English Books Online.

Whitehead, George. "No remission without repentance." 1665. Early English Books Online.

American Journalism in Southeast Asia

Comparing U.S. Media Coverage and
Public Reaction to the Vietnam War Versus the
Cambodian Genocide, 1970-198

By: Samantha Lee '22

The latter half of the 20th century marked a deeply unsettling time for American politics and foreign influence. In the midst of the Cold War (both abroad and at home), the general public lived in fear of a communist takeover that would threaten American capitalist values. Several communist uprisings across the globe in Southeast Asia compounded this fear. In particular, communist and capitalist governments came to a head in Vietnam, with the Vietnam War from 1955 to 1975, and Cambodia, with the Khmer Rouge-led Cambodian genocide from 1975 to 1979. In response to the Viet Cong threat of communism, America inserted itself into the infamous Vietnam War, sending thousands of troops and hundreds of journalists abroad for years. In response to the communist Khmer Rouge takeover of Cambodia, America stayed relatively divorced from the conflict, rarely reporting on the atrocities of the Khmer Rouge and the genocide occurring.

Because the two communist conflicts of Vietnam and Cambodia are so similar in time, motive, and even location, it is natural to draw parallels between American public reactions to the crises. In an in-depth comparison, however, American public reactions to both conflicts appear to differ significantly. Along with this difference comes a disproportionate number of available sources from the time. In order to compare the two conflicts, I examine American newspaper and journal articles reporting on the Vietnam War and the Cambodian genocide. However, almost immediately the sources begin to spell out a key difference between the cases: whereas all primary sources on the Vietnam War were published during the actual conflict, available U.S. media on the Cambodian genocide ranges from the beginnings of the conflict to years after when the atrocities became worldwide news. In this case, then, journalism published after the fact becomes a primary source, and the date when it was published becomes yet another data point to explore.

I also use secondary sources to gauge public reactions to the conflicts and analyze how these reactions may be related to media coverage. There are, however, significantly fewer media sources available for the

Cambodian conflict, further emphasizing the disparity of information available to the American public for these two cases. Additionally, while there is research examining media coverage and public reaction in Vietnam, there is little research into how the media played into American policy in Cambodia. This is seemingly related to the fact that America fought an entire war in Vietnam to prevent the communist Viet Cong from taking over, yet withdrew after only a few years from Cambodia despite the equally communist threat of the Khmer Rouge.

When considering these differences, several questions emerge. What caused these different U.S. reactions to communist threats that appear similar on paper, and how did the media engage with them? Why were American policy and media responses to the Vietnam War and Cambodian genocide so different? In the era of the Vietnam War and the Cambodian genocide, American media was a staple of everyday culture, with radios remaining a long-treasured mainstay and televisions just beginning to become commonplace. How influential was this rapid, all-encompassing journalism in affecting American public attitudes and shaping foreign involvement?

Overview and Media Coverage

Many individuals see the Vietnam War today as an embodiment of the flaws in the United States' foreign policy. American involvement in the country began as early as the 1940s, and with the inception of the Cold War, Vietnam suddenly became a battleground of ideologies. In 1954, after Vietnam successfully drove out French occupiers, the international sphere divided the country into North and South Vietnam in order to appease the communist powers of China and the Soviet Union while also placating the democratic ideals of the Western world. North Vietnam became the communist stronghold, led by Ho Chi Minh, and South Vietnam remained non-communist, backed by America. However, tensions began to escalate

with the creation of the communist “Viet Cong” in South Vietnam, publicly supported by North Vietnam.¹

In response to this conflict, President John F. Kennedy increased both economic and military aid to Vietnam. After Kennedy’s assassination, President Lyndon B. Johnson reaffirmed American commitment to the war, believing Vietnam to be the most important linchpin in staving off worldwide communism. However, the American press and public did not agree, eventually making Vietnam into one of America’s most hotly protested wars. Finally, through the Paris Peace Accords in 1973, America abandoned Vietnam and allowed North Vietnam to conquer South Vietnam, forming one communist country.²

Much like America’s role in the conflict, U.S. press representation of the war fluctuated over the years. Originally, press was scarce on the war, and journalists remained reluctant to show the ongoing atrocities. The turning point only came in 1967, with U.S. troops launching the horrific Tet Offensive and My Lai massacre.³ During the My Lai massacre, the American military killed an entire town of Vietnamese civilians, including women and children. After the incident made front-page news, American public opinion and support of the Johnson administration dropped significantly, from 4:1 favoring Johnson to 2:1. Additionally, witnessing the massacre first hand inspired some U.S. soldiers to speak out publicly against the atrocities of Vietnam, as they hoped to protest U.S. policies abroad and spark public outrage.⁴ These events led to increased American dissent on the war and a much greater U.S. press presence, as the realities of Vietnam became front-page and journalists stopped shying away from reporting the brutality.

Despite the U.S. government’s attempts to suppress media coverage, public demand fueled journalistic inquiries. In 1972, even the U.S.

¹ “The Vietnam War,” in *America in the World*, ed. Jeffrey A Engel, Mark Atwood Lawrence, and Andrew Preston, p. 255-256.

² Ibid.

³ Christopher James Levesque, “Not Just Following Orders: Avoiding and Reporting Atrocities During the Vietnam War,” p. 4-5.

⁴ Ibid., p. 5-6.

government's "deliberate move[s] to prevent reporters from visiting fronts and witnessing battles themselves" were denounced by reporters and became well-publicized for the public to consume.⁵ American reporters catered to public demand for controversial war coverage and decried the Johnson administration's tactics in Vietnam, going so far as to call the war "not only genocide, biocide and ecocide but also 'culture-cide'"—only adding fuel to the already burning fire of public outcry.⁶

By contrast, America had extremely limited involvement in the Cambodian genocide. The communist ideation of the country began in 1951, with Vietnamese communist influence establishing the Khmer People's Revolutionary Party, a communist group in Cambodia that promoted peasantry. In 1968, while fighting the Vietnam War and growing increasingly concerned with the communist influence in Cambodia, the U.S. government dropped 161,000 tons of bombs on Cambodia.⁷ America continued invasions and assaults until 1973.⁸ Rural Cambodians directly blamed America for their displacement and many of the country's economic problems. As one villager noted, "Sometimes the bombs fell and hit little children, and their father would be all for the Khmer Rouge."⁹ In 1976, in the wake of the chaos, Pol Pot rose to power as the prime minister of the new "Democratic Kampuchea," aided by civilian anger toward American imperialism. Guided by the new leader, the Khmer Rouge, an outfit opposed to Vietnamese and American influence, began to persecute Muslims, Arabs, Pakistanis, Cham, Indians, and other minorities.¹⁰ This then escalated to direct killings of all Cambodian people – regardless of religion, race, or location. By 1970, the communist party had fully shifted against the original Vietnamese influences and radicalized.

⁵ Harish Chandola, "Vietnam War Becomes Secret," *Economic and Political Weekly* 7, no. 31/33, August 1972, p. 1505.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 1507.

⁷ "The Cambodian Genocide 1975-1979," in *Century of Genocide: Critical Essays and Eyewitness Accounts*, 3rd ed., ed. Samuel Totten and William S. Parsons, p. 18.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 2-3.

Much like Vietnamese press coverage, American media shied away from graphic descriptions of Cambodian violence from the beginning. However, unlike Vietnam, the coverage and public attention never escalated. Sources published during the genocide are scarce and sometimes outright deny the atrocities. There is, in fact, a distinct lack of American media sources from 1973 (the year America withdrew from the country) to 1980 (a year after the genocide ended). Sources published after the genocide are dry and non-descriptive, focusing on political motivations rather than physical atrocities, as in Vietnam. The closest that one analysis from 1979 (the tail end of the genocide) comes to describing these atrocities is the mention that the Khmer Rouge attempted to “exclude all non-Khmers from Cambodian society,” instead focusing the bulk of the analysis on Cambodian-Vietnamese relations.¹¹ Another American analysis published in the wake of the genocide declares the genocide “grossly distorted” and even cites American eyewitness accounts of 1979 Cambodia attesting that, “We saw no such abuses ourselves...Where are those armed guards oppressing the peasantry?”¹² This same source also casts doubt on any other media source that published materials on the genocide, suggesting that photographs could be faked and that many photos have unclear “origin and authenticity.”¹³ Altogether, American accounts from the time of the genocide point to a limited and emotionless media portrayal of the Cambodian case.

These characteristics are heightened when compared to media portrayals of the Vietnam War. To achieve a fair comparison, I draw attention to two sources, both examples of the first-person commentaries on the different conflicts. The first is an article about the Cambodian genocide written by acclaimed U.S. journalist Sydney Schanberg. As Schanberg walks the city of Phnom Penh several years after the genocide,

¹¹ Karl D. Jackson, "Cambodia 1978: War, Pillage, and Purge in Democratic Kampuchea," *Asian Survey* 19, no. 1, January 1979, p. 81.

¹² David Boggett, "Democratic Kampuchea and Human Rights: Correcting the Record," *Economic and Political Weekly* 14, no. 18, May 5, 1979, p. 813+.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 816.

he notes the run-down streets and signs of malnutrition.¹⁴ His interviews with survivors note the significant death counts but no detailed descriptions, and the through line of the piece is the idea that “Hope, though it could be wishful, is on the rise in this city.”¹⁵ His main observation is the lack of population caused by the genocidal regime of Pol Pot.¹⁶

Contrasting this account is the *Winter Soldier* film, a 1972 documentary film of several U.S. Vietnam War veterans calling for an end to the conflict at an anti-war conference. The film, a collection of testimony interspersed with footage and images of the war, was created in reaction to the My Lai massacre and attempted to open viewers’ eyes to the atrocities occurring in Vietnam. Sparse shots and anonymous filmmakers were intended to focus the viewer only on the graphic details of the testimonies.¹⁷ Veterans testify in extreme detail to throwing people out of planes, burning villages, raping women, killing wounded prisoners, and stoning children to death, among other atrocities. It is here that the nature of the media in both cases diverges; where Schanberg notes the Cambodian genocide by the absence of detail, or the “millions of missing people,” Vietnam press is almost overwhelmed with the wealth of gruesome imagery available to the American public during the war, as well as first-hand witness accounts that paint a picture of the violence.

American Involvement

With a general understanding of the nature of the media available to Americans during these times, questions begin to arise as to why the press varied so widely. One answer seems obvious: personal connection. With more than 500,000 American people physically fighting in Vietnam, nearly everyone at home knew someone in the forces.¹⁸ Thus, where Cambodia may seem far away and disconnected, the issue of the Vietnam War held

¹⁴ Sydney Schanberg, "Cambodians Dare to Hope Despite Days of Evil," *Toronto Star*, September 2, 1989, n.p., <https://www-proquest-com.libproxy2.usc.edu/docview/436047376?accountid=14749>.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 5.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 3.

¹⁷ Ron Wilson, "Winter Soldier (1972)," *Moving Image* 7, no. 1 (2007): p. 122+.

¹⁸ Richard R. Lau, Thad A. Brown, and David O. Sears, "Self-Interest and Civilians' Attitudes toward the Vietnam War," *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 42, no. 4 (Winter 1978): p. 465.

extreme self-interest for the American public. In particular, American media hinged on the element of “ethnocentrism”—that is, the idea “that a story was news only if Americans were somehow involved.”¹⁹ However, another major reason for the disparities is also glaringly simple: access. American connection to Vietnam via the war lent American journalists specific access to the atrocities, enabling the establishment of full-time American media offices in Saigon beginning in 1961 and resulting in an uptick in the popularity of combat reporting during the time of the Vietnam War.²⁰

In particular, U.S. involvement in Vietnam resulted in the priceless testimonies of those Americans directly involved in the war. Army generals in newspapers decried “the illegality and immorality of the present U.S. involvement in an undeveloped peasant country nine to ten thousand miles away” and pointed to detailed reports that described “the horrors of U.S. forces’ atrocities in Vietnam.”²¹ Soldiers’ accounts of the war led to anti-war documentaries like the *Winter Soldier*, which created a template for other popular anti-war films in the coming years like *Hearts and Mind* and *Apocalypse Now*.²² As the war continued, more veterans and army officials began reporting atrocities they had witnessed or even taken part in.²³ This involvement was compounded by “a credulous media uncritically report[ing] all atrocities attributed to American soldiers as fact because journalists viewed the war as one big atrocity.”²⁴ Such coverage engendered dissent across the country. In contrast to the highly secretive Cambodian genocide, during the Vietnam War, the American public was able to experience the atrocities first-hand through their newspapers and television

¹⁹ Clarence R. Wyatt, “The Media and the Vietnam War,” in *The War That Never Ends: New Perspectives on the Vietnam War*, ed. David L. Anderson and John Ernst, p. 267.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 272.

²¹ “Army General Blasts Vietnam Policy,” *Sun Reporter* (San Francisco), November 22, 1969, p. 1-2, <https://www-proquest-com.libproxy2.usc.edu/docview/369617249?accountid=14749>.

²² Wilson, “Winter Soldier (1972),” p. 123.

²³ Christopher James Levesque, “Not Just Following Orders: Avoiding and Reporting Atrocities During the Vietnam War,” p. 133-134.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 129-130.

screens. This deluge of information helped to shape public sentiment and, specifically, criticism.

While it is impossible to tabulate the exact feelings of every single American nationwide, the general consensus was that the Vietnam War, specifically America's involvement in it, was unfavorable. In fact, most Americans favored never having gotten involved with Vietnam in the first place. Quantitative statistics gauge that two-thirds of college professors in 1967 believed the U.S. should never "have become militarily involved in South Vietnam originally."²⁵ In a more comprehensive sample from 1971, 42 percent of the American public identified as anti-war "doves," who favored reduced military involvement in Vietnam. In contrast, 44 percent identified as pro-war "hawks" who advocated for increased military involvement.²⁶ Additionally, nearly half of American voters believed Vietnam to be the most important issue during the 1968 election.²⁷ Although dissenters were not a majority, they are by no means dismissible; a war with roughly equal numbers of supporters and dissenters is clearly a contested war.

As early as 1966, civilians began speaking out against the war, with one nurse proposing that "By publicly showing their concern over the war in Vietnam through letters, discussions, and debates, perhaps nurses can help in bringing about a change from destructive to constructive means of solving the complex problems of Vietnam".²⁸ However, protests became more tepid in following years. Newspapers published public referendums that "called for immediate withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Vietnam" and lambasted "the immobility and stone headedness of the Johnson and Nixon administrations' refusal to yield to citizen protest."^{29 30}

²⁵ Armor et al., p. 162.

²⁶ Robert B. Smith, "The Vietnam War and Student Militancy," *Social Science Quarterly* 52, no. 1 (June 1971): p. 135.

²⁷ Lau et al., p. 464-465.

²⁸ Judson, p. 1002.

²⁹ "End Vietnam War Meeting," *Sun Reporter* (San Francisco), September 19, 1970, p. 1, <https://www-proquest-com.libproxy2.usc.edu/docview/370673306?accountid=14749>.

³⁰ "The Tragedy of Vietnam," *Sun Reporter* (San Francisco), April 25, 1970, p. 1, <https://www-proquest-com.libproxy2.usc.edu/docview/370719956?accountid=14749>.

However, if Vietnam caused an outcry, Cambodia barely provoked a whimper. The loudest protests occurred in the early 1970s, as multiple American media sources decried U.S. involvement in Cambodia. There were large-scale protests in the U.S. against the bombings of Cambodia as early as 1970, all of which were noted in local newspapers.³¹ Dissent continued, as journalists drew direct comparisons to the Vietnam War and published official criticism of “the United States of America...again [being] plunged into a war by the secret decisions of a small group of men.” Furthermore, they echoed “the hopes of millions of Americans and Indochinese that peace, with or without honor had come to Southeast Asia.”³² Some journalists went even farther, calling U.S. involvement in Cambodia a “New Vietnam” and accusing Nixon of “entrapping the United States deeper into the mire of war” in Indochina, despite “unprecedented popular resistance to the U.S.” by Cambodian people.”³³ All of these news clippings, however, were published from 1970 to 1973—during which time the U.S. repeatedly bombed Cambodia in hopes of stopping the spread of communism. And while all decried U.S. involvement in a manner similar to the Vietnam War, they never mentioned the Khmer Rouge.

The subsequent withdrawal of American troops and aid from Cambodia in 1973 resulted in a dearth of U.S. media on the subject until after the genocide ended in 1979. Going by the “ethnocentrism” of the press, the U.S. simply had no personal connection to the conflict, nor any way to ensure accurate journalism or first-hand accounts. As a result, the media depicted the Cambodian genocide as not a genocide at all, instead suggesting that “starvation, lack of medical care, the forced and sudden evacuation of Phnom Penh and other cities (such as Battambang), and hard working conditions in the fields” were responsible for mass deaths. They even went so far as to blame Vietnamese propaganda for “rumors” of genocide, when in fact “the exaggerated claims that as many as 2 million

³¹ Johnson, p. 4.

³² Quoted in “Dellums Committee Warnings,” p. 10.

³³ “Cambodia: New Vietnam?,” p. 9.

Cambodians have been killed or had died since the liberation of Phnom Penh in 1975 are absurd.”³⁴

Most sources, like Schanberg, only describe the violence as deliberate genocide after the fact. And even then, the trail of newspapers suggests that the truth about the Khmer Rouge regime and their deliberate killings took several years to become widespread. When U.S. press on Cambodia again became available in 1980, all news articles celebrated an end to the starvation, with no mention of deliberate killings. U.S. headlines in 1980 declared sentiments like “Cambodia Is No Longer Starving” or “Cambodia: Food Gains.”³⁵ ³⁶ Schanberg’s account of Cambodia is one of the first direct mentions to the Khmer Rouge’s genocide, and it was not published until 1980—a year after the genocide ended.³⁷ Not only was U.S. press in Cambodia characterized by a lack of personal connection, but it was also characterized by extreme secrecy surrounding the genocide. With the Khmer Rouge exercising complete control over Cambodia and the lack of media presence there, the truth about the genocide remained hidden during its occurrence and took several years after the fact to come out.

Furthermore, from an American media perspective, those sources that do report on the human rights abuses deliberately deny U.S. responsibility and even paint the U.S. as a savior. The same articles celebrating an end to the Cambodian starvation blame the Vietnamese Army or even the Thai government for causing the hunger while praising “the flames of generosity” emanating from the Western World’s relief efforts of “235,000 tons [of rice] from the West” and “60,000 [tons of seeds] from the West” delivered to starving Cambodians.³⁸ ³⁹ These newspapers that decried U.S. involvement and encouraged troop removal

³⁴ Boggett, “Democratic Kampuchea and Human Rights: Correcting the Record,” p. 815-818.

³⁵ “Cambodia Is No Longer Starving,” *New York Times*, November 27, 1980, sec. A, p. 26, <https://www-proquest-com.libproxy2.usc.edu/docview/424007278?accountid=14749>.

³⁶ Frederic A. Moritz, “Cambodia: Food Gains,” *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), December 24, 1980, n.p., <https://www-proquest-com.libproxy2.usc.edu/docview/1039003137?accountid=14749>.

³⁷ Schanberg, “Cambodians Dare to Hope Despite Days of Evil,” n.p.

³⁸ “Cambodia Is No Longer Starving,” p. 26.

³⁹ Moritz, “Cambodia: Food Gains,” p. 1.

do not mention initial U.S. involvement in the country when celebrating the end of the Khmer Rouge regime.

In a purely political sphere, U.S. press further separates itself from the conflict by virtue of its role in the larger “Western world.” One 1987 letter to the editor of an American newspaper calls for *international* prosecution of the Khmer Rouge, as “Unfortunately, under international law the United States cannot be the nation that asks the World Court to hear the case.”⁴⁰ When the trials against the Khmer Rouge finally commenced in 2008, the U.S. was only publicly mentioned among Britain, Japan, Canada, and India in the prosecution team.⁴¹ Thus, even in court, the American government, media, and public were only associated with Cambodia in an international context, as the country continued to divorce itself from the violence and its role in it.

Comparison

American press coverage of the Vietnam War and the Cambodian genocide differed significantly, most notably in terms of connection to and responsibility for the events. One clear reason is ethnocentrism and increased U.S. involvement in Vietnam: the media follows the people, and the American people were in Vietnam. Because American soldiers were the ones committing the atrocities, there was far more opportunity and availability for first-hand, verified accounts of the violence. However, given that a key component of genocide is secrecy, it is no surprise that the Cambodian genocide was hidden from the American public and denounced as a rumor. The coverage about Cambodia was scarcer because U.S. involvement was scarcer. Thus, the greater question arises of how U.S. involvement differed and why this may be for such similar communist threats.

After the Vietnam War, and even towards the tail end of it, the U.S. began shifting its strict anti-communist policy to favor noninvolvement in foreign conflict. This timeline is evidenced by both U.S. foreign policy and

⁴⁰ Stanton, p. 26.

⁴¹ Duncan, p. 21.

media in Cambodia at the time. In 1971, American press decried U.S. commitment “to maintain at any cost the Lon Nol regime, created in May 1970 when the U.S. invaded Cambodia on the pretext of ‘wiping out Communist sanctuaries’.”⁴² However, once the U.S. withdrew from Vietnam in 1973, American foreign policies in Indochina began to shift. By 1974, the U.S. government actively avoided taking action against the Khmer Rouge despite its communism, continually favoring peaceful, political solutions over outright war. Despite the rumors of genocide and the widespread food shortages compounded by the Khmer Rouge regime, the U.S. refused to oppose Pol Pot as his “guerrillas are the only serious military power in the disorganized anti-Vietnamese resistance.” One official went so far as to say, “The idea that we [the U.S.] should help the noncommunist resistance in order to create a counterweight to Pol Pot is just wishful thinking.”⁴³

These complicated politics between Vietnam and Cambodia not only characterized U.S. policy but also U.S. press. Because Cambodia and Vietnam were at odds with each other, the U.S. press was forced to balance outcry against the Viet Cong with the conflict between the Viet Cong and the Khmer Rouge. In 1980, a year after the genocide, one newspaper observed the tensions that the US press needed to navigate with respect to Indochina: journalists “who report from Vietnamese-controlled areas on evidence of past Khmer Rouge atrocities or on signs of economic improvement draw fire for aiding Vietnam’s efforts to justify its presence [in Cambodia],” while journalists “who visit Khmer Rouge base areas and describe guerrilla leaders’ denials of atrocities...are accused of helping the Khmer Rouge continue its military struggle and political campaign to be recognized as Cambodia’s legitimate government to the U.N.”⁴⁴ In this sense, the previous struggle in Vietnam further complicates U.S. policy and

⁴² “Cambodia: New Vietnam?,” p. 9.

⁴³ Rod Nordland, Zofia Smardz, Kim Willenson, and Frank Gibney, Jr., “Should the U.S. Get Involved?”, *Newsweek*, April 8, 1985, p. 32, <https://www-proquest-com.libproxy1.usc.edu/docview/1883524924?accountid=14749&imgSeq=3>.

⁴⁴ Frederic A. Moritz, “Newspapers Ensnared in Propaganda Swirl over Cambodia,” *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), October 2, 1980, p. 5.

press in Cambodia, leading to less journalism and discussion of the genocide overall.

The general idea promoted by U.S. media post-Vietnam War seemed to be that America should dismiss the conflict in Cambodia, as “deeper involvement could also compromise the U.S. ability to play a constructive role in any peace settlement.”⁴⁵ Beyond this, U.S. journalists cited the original American bombings of Cambodia, which resulted in floods of refugees and severe food shortages, as evidence of the harmful effects of U.S. involvement, the complicated politics with Vietnam, and the importance of a Cambodian government “free of foreign intervention [that] represents the wishes of the Khmer people”^{46 47}

In comparison to U.S. policy against the Viet Cong on the basis of communism, differences are stark and immediately apparent. Despite the communist takeover in Cambodia, the U.S. press reported that American officials were “not interested in fueling another civil war” and “want[ed] a political solution.”⁴⁸ Furthermore, in the aftermath of the genocide, the U.S. continued to condone the communist Khmer Rouge rather than incite conflict; as one journalist notes, the U.S. made “no substantial effort to prevent the return of the Khmer Rouge,” “supported the Khmer Rouge’s retaining U.S. representation,” and “failed to implement the U.S. signature on genocide convention by moving to bring the Khmer Rouge to justice.”⁴⁹ Given that the Cambodian genocide occurred directly after the Vietnam War, the conclusion seems clear that American policy in Vietnam played a huge role in American policy in Cambodia. It is also indisputable that, in the modern era, the press played an integral role in the foreign conflict. To address some of the questions that began this analysis, we now must ask:

⁴⁵ Nordland et al., “Should the U.S. Get Involved?”, p. 32.

⁴⁶ Boggett, “Democratic Kampuchea and Human Rights: Correcting the Record,” p. 818.

⁴⁷ Justus M. van der Kroef, “The United States and the Cambodian Problem: Political Realities and Policy Options.” *Asian Affairs: An American Review* 9, no. 2 (November/December 1981): p. 69.

⁴⁸ Elizabeth Becker, “U.S. Blames Phnom Penh Regime for Cambodian Talks’ Stalemate,” *The Washington Post*, August 30, 1989, sec. A, p. 38.

⁴⁹ Jeremy J. Stone, “Accomplices to a New Genocide Cambodia: Our Department of State, Which Acquiesced in the Holocaust, Has Cultivated Another Monstrosity in Backing the Khmer Rouge,” *Los Angeles Times*, December 3, 1989, p. 2.

To what extent, then, does the press influence policy? And how closely are U.S. policies in Vietnam and Cambodia truly related?

Conclusion

The press is undeniably a key facet of the U.S. personality, protected under the First Amendment to the Constitution. Nowhere is the importance of the press more obvious than in U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War and Cambodia. With ethnocentrism and sheer availability driving copious journalism during the Vietnam War, the media was able to stoke the flames of dissent with testimonies from soldiers, generals, and journalists. Due to the amount and detail of this coverage, public opinion shifted from largely anti-communist sentiment to a comparable contingent of anti-war protesters. The outcry was so substantial, in fact, that an international tribunal was called in 1967 to discuss America's role in Vietnam, eventually declaring the U.S. "guilty on all charges, including genocide, the use of forbidden weapons, maltreatment and killing of prisoners, [and] violence and forceful movement of prisoners."⁵⁰ Although this tribunal never resulted in any concrete action, its widespread dissipation did further stoke the flames of anti-war sentiment—a reflection of the power of the press in influencing the public. In comparison, the U.S. press had neither personal connection nor any insider information to the Cambodian genocide and did not decry the Khmer Rouge until years after the genocide ended. Even then, calls for prosecution were raised by individuals and required the international support of "several countries" to bring the case before the U.N.⁵¹ U.S. journalism on Cambodia was characterized by its nonexistence following U.S. withdrawal.

Thus, there is a direct cycle in that the U.S. press shaped public sentiment, which shaped U.S. policies in Vietnam, which shaped U.S. policies in Cambodia. Once the U.S. press shifted to condemning atrocities abroad after the My Lai massacre, protests increased. As the war dragged

⁵⁰ Cody J. Foster, "Did America Commit War Crimes in Vietnam?" *New York Times*, December 2, 2017, p. 1.

⁵¹ Nancy Blodgett, "Cambodia Case: Lawyer Wants Genocide Trial," *ABA Journal* 71, no. 11 (November 1985): p. 31.

on unsuccessfully, people began to favor noninvolvement in Vietnam in the first place.⁵² This sentiment affected the U.S. government, as the U.S. withdrew from the almost identical threat of communism in Cambodia at the same time they withdrew from the Vietnam War.

The favoring of political solutions as opposed to a strict no-communism policy represents a direct shift attributable to the disastrous war in Vietnam. Graphic, repeated testimonies to personal American violence resulted in calls to pull out of Indochina.⁵³ Once America removed itself from Indochina, press coverage ceased. This trend explains the disparity in media between Vietnam and Cambodia during the 1960s and 1970s, and why the genocide was not well-known or publicized until the latter half of the 1980s. Communism shifted to the side as U.S. policies began to reflect the press demands that had shaped civilian outcry. In this way, American involvement in the Cambodian genocide is not necessarily comparable to Vietnam so much as contextualized and shaped by it, and the press's importance and role in shaping public opinion cannot go unnoticed.

The press holds immense power, especially in conflicts overseas. While it is impossible to contribute the entirety of U.S. "dove" sentiment to media, availability and content of the press can be directly tied to public outcry, as is evidenced by the widely-reported, widely-contested Vietnam War and the unreported, largely unnoticed Cambodian genocide in America. Journalism is one of the public's most reliable and accessible windows into foreign affairs, and the content that journalists collect and distribute shape opinion at home. As a result, the press holds an immense responsibility to the people that it reports on and for—a responsibility that the U.S. press neglected in its underreporting of the U.S.'s role in the Cambodian genocide. And by brushing the years of American bombings under the rug after withdrawing from Cambodia, the press contributed to the U.S. refusal to take responsibility for or involve itself directly with the prosecution of the Khmer Rouge.

⁵² Smith, "The Vietnam War and Student Militancy," p. 145.

⁵³ "End Vietnam War Meeting," p. 10.

Today, as the U.S. continues to involve itself in conflicts abroad, the media remains a staple in galvanizing dissent, quieting the masses, and influencing government policies. Both the Vietnam War and the Cambodian genocide occurred half a century ago, but they signify the continuing power of journalism. It is of the utmost importance that the press then recognizes its role in foreign affairs and respects the influence it holds.

Bibliography

Primary Sources

"Army General Blasts Vietnam Policy." *Sun Reporter* (San Francisco).

November 22, 1969, 11.

<https://www-proquest-com.libproxy2.usc.edu/docview/369617249?accountid=14749>.

Becker, Elizabeth. "U.S. Blames Phnom Penh Regime for Cambodian Talks' Stalemate." *The Washington Post*, August 30, 1989, sec. A, 38.

ProQuest Historical Newspapers.

Blodgett, Nancy. "Cambodia Case: Lawyer Wants Genocide Trial." *ABA Journal* 71, no. 11 (November 1985): 31.

<https://www.jstor.org/stable/20758428>.

Boggett, David. "Democratic Kampuchea and Human Rights: Correcting the Record." *Economic and Political Weekly* 14, no. 18 (May 5, 1979): 813-821.

"Cambodia Is No Longer Starving." *New York Times*. November 27, 1980, sec. A, 26.

<https://www-proquest-com.libproxy2.usc.edu/docview/424007278?accountid=14749>.

"Cambodia: New Vietnam?" *Sun Reporter* (San Francisco). January 30, 1971, 9.

<https://www-proquest-com.libproxy2.usc.edu/docview/370791722?accountid=14749>.

Chandola, Harish. "Vietnam War Becomes Secret." *Economic and Political Weekly* 7, no. 31/33 (August 1972): 1505-07.

"Don't Forget Cambodia." *Sun Reporter* (San Francisco). May 12, 1973, 7.
<https://www-proquest-com.libproxy2.usc.edu/docview/370696622?accountid=14749>.

Duncan, Brooks. "Cambodia: Year Zero on Trial: The Trial of a Few Surviving Leaders of the Notorious Khmer Rouge Regime, Which Ruled Cambodia in the 1970s, Is Finally Underway. but the Court Is a Strange One." *The New Internationalist*, no. 415 (September 2008): 21-24.
<https://www-proquest-com.libproxy1.usc.edu/docview/1797168782?accountid=14749&imgSeq=1>.

"End Vietnam War Meeting." *Sun Reporter* (San Francisco). September 19, 1970, 10.
<https://www-proquest-com.libproxy2.usc.edu/docview/370673306?accountid=14749>.

Jackson, Karl D. "Cambodia 1978: War, Pillage, and Purge in Democratic Kampuchea." *Asian Survey* 19, no. 1 (January 1979): 72-84.

Johnson, George. "Massive Cambodia Protest." *Sun Reporter* (San Francisco), May 9, 1970, 4.
<http://libproxy.usc.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/docview/370730317?accountid=14749>.

Judson, Leona. "Nurse Questions Vietnam War." *The American Journal of Nursing* 55, no. 5 (May 1966): 1002.
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/3419922>.

Moritz, Frederic A. "Cambodia: Food Gains." *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), December 24, 1980.
<https://www-proquest-com.libproxy2.usc.edu/docview/1039003137?accountid=14749>.

Moritz, Frederic A. "Newspapers Ensnared in Propaganda Swirl over Cambodia." *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), October 2, 1980, 5. ProQuest Historical Newspapers.

Nordland, Rod, Zofia Smardz, Kim Willenson, and Frank Gibney, Jr. "Should the U.S. Get Involved?" *Newsweek*, April 8, 1985, 32.
<https://www-proquest-com.libproxy1.usc.edu/docview/1883524924?accountid=14749&imgSeq=3>.

Schanberg, Sydney. "Cambodians Dare to Hope despite Days of Evil." *Toronto Star*, September 2, 1989.
<https://www-proquest-com.libproxy2.usc.edu/docview/436047376?accountid=14749>.

Stanton, Gregory. "U.S. Impotence on the Cambodian Genocide Issue." *The New York Times*, June 4, 1987, sec. A, 26. ProQuest Historical Newspapers.

Stone, Jeremy J. "Accomplices to a New Genocide Cambodia: Our Department of State, Which Acquiesced in the Holocaust, Has Cultivated Another Monstrosity in Backing the Khmer Rouge." *Los Angeles Times*, December 3, 1989.
<https://www-proquest-com.libproxy2.usc.edu/docview/280863336?accountid=14749>.

"The Tragedy of Vietnam." *Sun Reporter* (San Francisco). April 25, 1970, 12.
<https://www-proquest-com.libproxy2.usc.edu/docview/370719956?accountid=14749>.

Winter Soldier. Performed by Ernest Paul Sachs, Joseph Bangert, and Scott Shimabukuro. Produced by Winterfilm Collective and Vietnam Veterans Against the War. Milestone Films, 1972. Accessed November 17, 2020.

<http://libproxy.usc.edu/login?url=https://video.alexanderstreet.com/watch/winter-soldier>.

Secondary Sources

Armor, David J., Joseph B. Giacquinta, R. Gordon McIntosh, and Diana E.H. Russell. "Professors' Attitudes toward the Vietnam War." *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 31, no. 2 (Summer 1967): 159-75.
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/2747196>.

"The Cambodian Genocide 1975-1979." In *Century of Genocide: Critical Essays and Eyewitness Accounts*, 3rd ed., edited by Samuel Totten and William S. Parsons, 360-73. N.p.: Routledge, n.d.

Foster, Cody J. "Did America Commit War Crimes in Vietnam?" *New York Times*, December 2, 2017.
https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/A516805129/HWRC?u=usocal_main&sid=HWRC&xid=d24ed60b.

Lau, Richard R., Thad A. Brown, and David O. Sears. "Self-Interest and Civilians' Attitudes toward the Vietnam War." *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 42, no. 4 (Winter 1978): 464-83.
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/2748371>.

Levesque, Christopher James. "Not Just following Orders: Avoiding and Reporting Atrocities during the Vietnam War." Ph.D diss. University of Alabama, 2014.

Smith, Robert B. "The Vietnam War and Student Militancy." *Social Science Quarterly* 52, no. 1 (June 1971): 133-56.
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/42860063>.

van der Kroef, Justus M. "The United States and the Cambodian Problem: Political Realities and Policy Options." *Asian Affairs: An American*

Review 9, no. 2 (November/December 1981): 69-84.
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/30172957>.

"The Vietnam War." In *America in the World*, edited by Jeffrey A. Engel, Mark Atwood Lawrence, and Andrew Preston, 255-80. N.p.: Princeton University Press, n.d.

Wilson, Ron. "Winter Soldier (1972)." *Moving Image* 7, no. 1 (2007): 122+.

Wyatt, Clarence R. "The Media and the Vietnam War." In *The War That Never Ends: New Perspectives on the Vietnam War*, edited by David L. Anderson and John Ernst, 265-87. N.p.: UP of Kentucky, n.d.
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt6wrrsx.16>.

Family Matters in Providence Island

Sex Politics and Problems in Peopling a
Puritan Colony, 1629-1635

By: Luis Rodriguez-Perez

In the formative years of the Providence Island Colony (1629-1635), families were fundamental to the organization of the colony. However, the role envisioned for family structures differed significantly between the colonists and their financiers in England. While the island's colonists—predominantly young men during the colony's first few years—sought to replicate the social structures they were familiar with in England, they desperately lacked the women to make this vision possible. The colonists wanted to create permanent family structures that envisioned women as caretakers of the home, but the Providence Island Company (PIC) was more interested in extracting profit and labor from their colony. They recognized that families were central to the social organization of the colony, but they also conceptualized women as an economic risk, discouraging many of them from coming to the island until 1635.¹ Instead, they organized these male colonists into artificial families with instituted hierarchies that prioritized production. While the PIC eventually recognized that women could play a critical role in the development of a Puritan society on Providence Island, their actions reflected ideas about gender and family which radically differed between them and the colonists who would come to deem women a non-negotiable asset.

Background

The Providence Island Company (PIC) established the Providence Island Colony with several goals in mind. First, they sought to create a Puritan society that could serve as a model of a reformed English society in the Americas. Many of these Puritans were disappointed with King Charles I of England's policies of peace towards Catholic Spain, so another goal for the colony was to establish a fortified privateering post to prey on Spanish ships. The island appeared apt for such use; modern inhabitants have referred to the island as “the rock,” a tall and impregnable vantage point in the middle of the Caribbean with mountains at the island's center reaching

¹ Alison Games, *Migrations and the Origins of the English Atlantic World*, p. 49.

up to 1,190'.² However, while it was an ideal privateering outpost, its agricultural potential was questionable. Its rich but rocky volcanic soil provided mixed results when cultivated, but early prospectors wrote optimistic letters to the PIC exclaiming that lucrative plants not only grew well but constantly bore fruit throughout the year, making harvesting a year-long process.³ This optimistic testimony was crucial for the PIC to justify investing in the islands' settlement since agricultural produce was envisioned as the islands' primary source of income. The Providence Island Company was made up of elite Puritan men who channeled their austere Puritanism with imperial economic aspirations.⁴ It was their need for profit that would lead them into conflict with the colonists.

The conflict born from these different goals and its role in the colony's failure have been the focus of scholars in the past. Karen Kupperman's *Providence Island 1629-1641* closely examines a holistic view of the happenings on Providence Island, specifically its failures. Alison Games' *Migrations and the Origins of the English Atlantic World* compares the different groups of emigrants who left London in 1635 using London's port register book to place the events of Providence Island within the larger sociohistorical context of English colonialism. My paper closely examines the idea of the 'artificial families' put forward in both texts, but with a new emphasis on gender.

Neither Kupperman nor Games emphasizes the role of women and neither looks closely at the role of the Miskitu, an indigenous people living sixteen miles west of Providence Island. Scholarship like Karl Offen's *The Miskitu Kingdom*, does look at the place of the Miskitu peoples, but not from the English context. This paper thus links these topics to examine the way the absence of English women and the presence of Miskitu women became a topic of disagreement between the colonists and the Company. To illustrate these tensions, I rely on a series of short-hand summaries of letters sent between the PIC in England and the foremost men of

² Karen Kupperman, *Providence Island 1629-1641*, p. 26.

³ Ibid., p. 32.

⁴ Ibid., p. 3.

Providence Island. Communication between both the settlers in the colony and the PIC in England were mediated by the stern puritan governor, Philip Bell. However, the PIC also kept separate contact with its privateering faction through Bell's father-in-law, Daniel Elfrith. It is through their letters with the PIC that the story of the Providence Island Colony emerged.

English Notions of Marriage & Family

Many of the settlers who were attracted to the Providence Island Colony were "of the same middling Puritan stripe" as those of New England and family mattered to them.⁵ These young men, though eager for a life of reform, lived during an age where the foremost concern of any aspiring young person was to marry, establish a family, and lead an economically stable life. In mainland England, the family fostered stability both as a social and economic unit. Puritan religious principles and marriage together satisfied the physical and emotional needs of young men and women and gave their lives a pragmatic direction.⁶ While marriages among the wealthy were necessary for economic growth, marriage was "free to all orders and sorts of men without exception."⁷ There was a definite social pressure on English men and women to marry in their twenties and create family units, which could give back to the parish and local community; in this function/situation, marriage served both a social and religious role. After getting married, young men and women were expected to form families. Families were the "basic unit of residence," responsible for the creation and consumption of economic resources.⁸ Children could inherit their family's property, marry, and widen the family's resource pool, slowly creating hierarchies of material status. This incentivized men and women to selectively choose their partners because they could potentially double their financial resources.

In order to marry, most men needed the prerequisite material status to support a family, and the Providence Island Company seemed to provide

⁵ Karen Kupperman, *Providence Island 1629-1641*, p. 1.

⁶ Keith Wrightson, *English Society 1580-1680*, p. 44.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 44.

a unique opportunity for unwed men. In the Providence Island Colony, settlers of higher status were offered land and indentured servants, and those indentured servants in turn were also offered land and servants upon completion of their terms for indentured servitude.⁹ Since land was extremely scarce in England, this economic opportunity also offered lower-status men a chance of consolidating their new wealth within permanent homes with lucrative agriculture plantations all while shaping a new English society. This was exacerbated by promises of abundant agricultural yields on the island.

When these expectations of wealth failed, both the colonists and company began to grow increasingly frustrated. The PIC perceived the lack of production as a sign of idleness and moved quickly to stamp it out however they deemed necessary. The PIC targeted idleness as “the nurse of all Vice,” quickly banning everything from drunkenness and swearing.¹⁰ When the organization of labor for the island was being considered, being able to monitor idleness became a primary concern, and the idea of distributing the colonists into ‘families’ began to take root. The colonists then asked for their wives, as well as more labor, in order to tackle the daunting task of planting enough commodities to satisfy the PIC’s demands, but their pleas fell on deaf ears.¹¹

The Introduction of Artificial Families and its Dissolution

In 1631, in order to organize the colony’s men, the PIC established ‘artificial families.’¹² This decision represented the PIC’s economic priority; they envisioned family units primarily as economic units of production. The PIC distributed the men into ‘artificial families of about seven men,’ with a single head of family, referred to as ‘chief,’ being able to purchase goods from the PIC’s magazine.¹³ At the order of the PIC, these chiefs were to

⁹ Karen Kupperman, *Providence Island 1629-1641*, p. 151.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 108.

¹² COSP, “Instructions to the Governor and Council of Providence Island,” February 7, 1631.

¹³ Karen Kupperman, *Providence Island 1629-1641*, p. 28; COSP, “Instructions to the Governor and Council of Providence Island,” February 7, 1631.

ensure that all men were to plant twice as much corn as could supply their own family, ensuring a food surplus which could be used by both the PIC and the colony to attract more settlers to the colony.¹⁴ These artificial families were intended as placeholders until the colony was secured enough to send women to complete each family unit. These chiefs were landed men with economic stakes in the PIC; thus, this early hierarchy was predicated on economic class status. At this point, the PIC was more focused on economic returns and labor organization than they were with the concerns of the colonists.

However, the organization of these new artificial families showed cracks beginning with the chiefs whose patriarchal power had been sanctioned by the PIC. Chiefs wanted their wives and family to the point where many were ready to leave if they were not allowed to have their wives on the island.¹⁵ For those wealthier patrons of the island, the PIC complied. This only reinforced the class disparity within and among the artificial families of the island; it was only the most prominent chiefs who felt ‘entitled’ by their socio-economic status to women. The first woman to be explicitly allowed by the PIC was the wife of William Hird. In 1631, he was allowed to leave the island to take his wife over with him. The PIC explicitly stated: “no other woman goes in the same ship” and “as yet there is no woman at all in the island;”¹⁶ this is the first time that the sources explicitly mention a purposeful lack of women on the island. This initial exception was quickly succeeded by others, with the wives of John Tanner (“employed in the PIC’s service”), and Maurice Boynes (an experienced diver and gunner) being allowed on the island shortly thereafter.¹⁷ Governor Philip Bell’s wife, at the PIC’s expense, was also sent in May of 1632 after he had threatened to quit over a salary dispute.¹⁸

¹⁴ COSP, “Instructions to the Governor and Council of Providence Island,” February 7, 1631.

¹⁵ Karen Kupperman, *Providence Island 1629-1641*, p. 159.

¹⁶ COSP, “Minutes of a General Court for Providence Island. Warwick House,” February 10, 1631.

¹⁷ COSP, “Minutes of a General Court for Providence Island. Warwick House,” May 19, 1631.

¹⁸ For Governor Philip Bell’s Wife see COSP, “The PIC of Providence Island to Capt. Phil. Bell,” May 10, 1632; for the salary dispute see Alison Games, *Migrations and the Origins of the English Atlantic World*, p. 49.

The presence of men's wives on the island reflected the hierarchy of status and influence. Tanner, Hurd, and Boynes were considered "highly-prized colonists" in the eyes of the PIC because of their invaluable skill sets, and their complacency was bought at the price of women.¹⁹ Back in England, wives of those more prominent settlers had become accustomed to collecting salaries on behalf of their husbands, frequently asking that their husbands be allowed to come home, and those women who were allowed transportation to the colony often went on the PIC's dime.²⁰ In 1632, the PIC promised to send a midwife on the *Seaflowes*' successor, and the colonists' economic concerns were temporarily alleviated with the arrival of some women and more supplies. While this alleviated the pressure put on the PIC by its most prominent colonists, those disaffected men on the island still yearned for a stronger female presence as the PIC's expectations for economic production only grew larger.

The artificial family model personified "only a crude approximation of the English families."²¹ Although it was intended to organize the haphazard collection of planters and servants into a cohesive colonial labor force, during a 3-year period between 1632 and 1635, a series of difficulties supports the idea that the economic family model was rejected by the colonists. The letter that accompanied the elite women of 1632 outlines increasing tensions as a direct result of the artificial families, with the PIC advising the colony: "[the PIC does] not insist upon men joining in families as formerly directed, but leave the planters 'to sort themselves.'"²² This same letter summarizes that the planters are "desirous to return home," while outlining the terms for unruly settlers to return home as well as punishments for those who should feel the need to act out.²³ This acting out may be tied to the emasculating effects of artificial families on men who were not in charge; living in a colonial family meant living under a male

¹⁹ Karen Kupperman, *Providence Island 1629-1641*, p. 158.

²⁰ For wives asking that their husbands be allowed home see Karen Kupperman, *Providence Island 1629-1641*, p. 159 ; for the finances of the women's transportation see COSP, "Agreement between the PIC [for Providence Island] and Capt. Robt. Hunt," March 1, 1636.

²¹ Alison Games, *Migrations and the Origins of the English Atlantic World*, p. 97.

²² COSP, "The PIC of Adventurers of Providence Island to the Governor and Council," May 10, 1632.

²³ *Ibid.*

householder.²⁴ Yet, it wasn't only the members of the artificial families who were anxious to go home, but also their chiefs', accompanying the last letter was another with "directions for the disposal of land of any master of a family leaving the island."²⁵ As the artificial family model crumbled, the PIC turned to developing the colony in other ways.

As the commodities of the colony repeatedly failed to turn a profit, and the looming danger of Spanish encroachment threatened the lives of the colonists on the island, the PIC's focus turned towards mainland trade with the Miskitu indigenous peoples. While the PIC was adamant that "the Indians [are] to receive good usage and encouragement to trade," they failed to consider the social effects that these new trading relations would have and unwittingly fostered strong interpersonal relationships between the colonists and the Miskitu.²⁶ The English traded with other indigenous peoples along the coast of central America, but with the Miskitu peoples they "cultivated friendships at an interpersonal level that was unprecedented."²⁷ The PIC's agenda explicitly sought to keep Anglo-Miskitu interactions at a platonic, religious, and economic level. One desire was "to propagate religion amongst the poor Indians."²⁸ One letter recorded that the PIC "[hopes] that by wise carriage and religious conversation those poor creatures may be won to the love of religion." And, to a degree, this hope came to pass. As Anglo-Miskitu trade boomed, some Miskitu began to adopt notions of Christianity, basics of the English language, and became accustomed to English manufactured goods.²⁹

Growing accustomed to trade with the northern Europeans, the Miskitu "began to view themselves as coequals" with the Europeans who took so much interest in them.³⁰ Many Miskitu even came onto the island to volunteer with public works on the island, although women remained

²⁴ Alison Games, *Migrations and the Origins of the English Atlantic World*, p. 96.

²⁵ COSP, "The PIC of Providence Island to Capt. Phil. Bell," May 10, 1632.

²⁶ COSP, "Minutes of a General Court for Providence Island. Warwick House," April 20, 1635.

²⁷ Karl Offen, *The Miskitu kingdom landscape and the emergence of a Miskitu ethnic identity, northeastern Nicaragua, and Honduras, 1600-1800*, p. 112.

²⁸ COSP, "The PIC of Adventurers of Providence Island to the Governor and Council," May 10, 1632.

²⁹ Karl Offen, *The Miskitu kingdom landscape and the emergence of a Miskitu ethnic identity, northeastern Nicaragua, and Honduras, 1600-1800*, p. 116.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 124.

forbidden.³¹ The PIC, seeking to build upon these new relationships while simultaneously proselytizing, “Specially approve[d] the desire to procure Indian children, and recommend[ed] that a small number of free men should be persuaded to accompany them, but no Indian woman.”³² They believed that by instructing children on the norms of Christianity and English customs they could begin to inconspicuously have their own interests represented within Miskitu society without them having to adopt any aspect of Miskitu culture or customs, and without integrating them into their community by the creation of mixed-race families. In other letters the PIC often mentioned that the colonists should not engage with the indigenous women while on the *Mosquitia*, “by all means to restrain offensive or wanton carriage towards the women.”³³ Miskitu women were also not allowed in the colony “for fear of some inconveniencies depending thereon.”³⁴ This policing of settler behavior stems not from any concern for the indigenous women, but rather their vested economic interest in establishing trading relations with the respective indigenous groups, converting them to Christianity, and avoiding mixed-race children. Many of the colonists, however, wanted Miskitu women on the island.

As the Company became more engaged in the mainland, so had the colonists’ interests, and many began to consider whether Anglo-Miskitu families were possible. As many of the colonists became accustomed to visiting the *Mosquitia*, they began to couple with some of the Miskitu women there.³⁵ At a certain point, the settlers felt comfortable enough requesting the PIC for permission to intermarry with or have access to the Miskitu women, so much so that Governor Philip Bell petitioned the PIC for permission to bring Miskitu women to the colony on their behalf. The PIC did not reject the idea outright. The PIC’s reply was documented in the Calendars of State Papers as “Not yet satisfied with his proposition for

³¹ Karen Kupperman, *Providence Island 1629-1641*, p. 166.

³² COSP, “The PIC of Adventurers of Providence Island to the Governor and Council,” May 10, 1632.

³³ COSP, “The PIC of Providence Island to Capt. Sussex Cammock,” July 30, 1634.

³⁴ Karen Kupperman, *Providence Island 1629-1641*, p. 166.

³⁵ Karl Offen, *The Miskitu kingdom landscape and the emergence of a Miskitu ethnic identity, northeastern Nicaragua, and Honduras, 1600-1800*, 1600-1800, p. 119.

bringing Indian women to the island.”³⁶ This implies that the PIC might have considered it, but only if done on their own terms. While the PIC controlled the flow of women from England, they now had to consider the possibility that settlers now had access to women if they defied the PIC’s wishes. Not wanting to appear unreasonable and jeopardize their economic strategy, they are measured in their reply.

There is an underlying implication that they were aware of sexual relationships between the English and the Miskitu women; stating “If children of either sex may be had, would not have that opportunity neglected of their Christian education.”³⁷ Here their concern centers on religion rather than the perils or profits interracial relationships. However, their wariness about allowing women and the fact they mention the children might point to a fear of a mixed-race colony whereas the colonists only cared about being able to establish families or relationships. Within this context the settlers seemed to be exercising their own agency by proactively seeking out alternative partners; in so doing, they were undermining the authority that the PIC had to control the flow of which specific women were allowed in the colony. The PIC’s micromanagement of settler-Miskitu interaction became the second facet of the gender ratio they sought desperately to control.

1635, the Year of the Midwife

By 1634, it became apparent that the PIC had rejected the idea of interracial couples and had allowed the first wave of English women. They instructed that women who were to be married could have the cost of their transportation remitted, likely at the expense of their prospective husband.³⁸ In 1635, the infamous midwife promised in 1632 arrived on the *Expectation*, indicating a transformative change in the colony’s sex politics and crippling the PIC’s perception that all-male artificial family units were just as sustainable on the island as traditional family units. Of the 27

³⁶ COSP, “Minutes of a General Court for Providence Island. Warwick House,” April 20, 1635.

³⁷ Karl Offen, *The Miskitu kingdom landscape and the emergence of a Miskitu ethnic identity, northeastern Nicaragua, and Honduras, 1600-1800*, p. 119.

³⁸ Karen Kupperman, *Providence Island 1629-1641*, p. 158.

women who travelled on the *Expectation*, the youngest among them travelled with their husbands, or to join their husbands, while single women were regarded as older, “between twenty and thirty.”³⁹ These older single women were likely meant for other older established men in Providence Island, allowing the colony to regain a semblance of the gender politics from England that still shaped the colonists’ worldview.

Conclusion

In the formative years of the Providence Island Company one can see two very different worldviews of gender and family. While both the PIC and colonists envisioned families to serve as a unit of economic security to an extent, only the PIC was comfortable with excluding women from the equation. They illustrated this through the introduction of artificial families, which prioritized hierarchy and production and deemphasized perceived gender roles. They also tried to stop relationships between colonists and Miskitu women. When they realized that they had miscalculated the importance of women to the colonists, they conceded, but only by allowing only those most prominent men to have their wives, further reinforcing hierarchy. Reacting to this scarce economy of women, and perhaps the denial of their traditional patriarchal power, the colonists begin to explore other means of attaining the family structures that they envisioned by looking to Miskitu women. Eventually, the PIC became briefly open to the request for Miskitu women but made sure that they controlled access. Despite the absence of women’s voices, the struggle for their presence manifests itself in these documents. They are wanted and envisioned as a necessary component of society by elites and poor alike within a male-dominated Puritan colony. Even though the PIC dictated an abstract economic view of family units, this was actively contested by the colonists. Women became a non-negotiable asset in the uphill struggle to build a Puritan colony and solidified as an irreplaceable component of the family within early colonial English society.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 160.

Bibliography

The Calendar of State Papers, Colonial: North America and the West Indies 1574-1739. Collection of Historical Manuscripts. Taylor & Francis Ltd. Accessed via USC Libraries/ProQuest.

Kupperman, Karen. *Providence Island, 1630-1641*. Cambridge, GBR: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

Games, Alison. *Migration and the origins of the English Atlantic world*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999.

Offen, Karl. *The Miskitu kingdom landscape and the emergence of a Miskitu ethnic identity, northeastern Nicaragua, and Honduras, 1600-1800*. Dissertation. Ann Arbor, MI: UMI Bell & Howell, 1999.

Wrightson, Keith. *English Society 1580-1680*. London: Hutchinson. Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005.

An Interview with Dr. Anne Goldgar on Microhistories and Tulip Mania

By: Christopher Aranda '22

When I am approached by a friend who is wondering what classes to register for in the coming term, I usually answer with a litany of professors' names. No matter the friend, Dr. Anne Goldgar always makes that list. I first met Dr.

Goldgar, who currently serves as the USC Van Hunnick Chair in European History, last fall, when I took her seminar course "Cultural History of Early Modern Europe." In the class, Dr. Goldgar framed previously written microhistories and journal articles as a mosaic gateway into the lives of ordinary early modern Europeans. Even through a computer screen, the brilliance of this approach shined, holding all the students transfixed on the material. This February, I had the privilege to talk with Dr. Goldgar for this semester's issue. In our conversation, we discussed her views on historical methodologies, her seminar's use of microhistories, and her recent book on Dutch tulip mania. On behalf of *The Scroll* Editorial Board, please enjoy a curated version of this discussion below.

Your 2007 book *Tulipmania: Money, Honor, and Knowledge in the Dutch Golden Age* challenged the prevailing theories of the Dutch tulip mania. What brought you to write *Tulipmania*?

After publishing my first book, *Impolite Learning: Conduct and Community in the Republic of Letters, 1680-1750*, I was hunting for a new topic for a second book. During this hunt, I became interested in history collecting and how people in the past would collect very rare and very strange items. So when I was reading Simon Schama's *Embarrassment of Riches: An Interpretation of Dutch Culture in the Golden Age* and he mentions tulip mania very briefly. So I went to see who had written about tulip mania and realized that very little had been written about it and, if it was written about, it wasn't written in a very interesting way. So, I just thought that it was an incredibly interesting topic that really had been neglected and hadn't been given its due. But it was a radical shift for me because I had primarily written about French history and now I was doing Dutch history so that was another change of course. So, I adjusted,

sharpened my Dutch language skills, and fell in love working in the Dutch archives trying to find the cultural patterns.

Did you find it difficult to challenge such seeded ideas about the tulip mania of the Dutch Golden Age?

I didn't intend to challenge those prevailing theories when I started. I just thought, "No one has written a serious archival study of this, so I can do it." The prevailing theory was that this mania was widespread, corrupted everything in the Netherlands, and destroyed the Dutch economy, but when I conducted this stringent primary source research, I discovered all those theories not to be the case. So, I hadn't started with the goal of doing a revisionist study, but it ended that way. I think that's a good thing to keep in mind for anyone doing research. If you know what you're going to say before you write, then you're going to end up saying that. On the other hand, if you don't know what you're going to say but you have questions, then you'll find things that you didn't expect and be more open minded for new evidence. So the opportunity to change one's mind is vastly wider when you're willing to suppress your biases and have more questions.

In *Tulipmania*, you write, "From tulip mania we learn something of what it was to live in this prosperous world, what dreams and enthusiasms this particular culture seemed to inspire." From that quote, it seems that you're critiquing the economic emphasis that scholars have put on tulip mania and in doing so they've neglected the cultural historical aspect. Is that correct?

I wouldn't say I'm "critiquing" the economic historical narrative of tulip mania, but I'm just taking a different approach. There's some validity to the economic histories of tulip mania, but my objection was that the economic histories weren't based on hard data because no one had done the archival work. I did have the assistance of economic historians in the work so I'm not too critical of the economic historical interpretation. I just believe that there are aspects of tulip mania that you can learn from the cultural interpretation. I often joke that the title of the book should've been

Tulipmania: More Boring Than You Thought and that's because I'm saying it wasn't a big disaster.

What projects do you have in the works right now?

I just finished co-editing three books and one of them has just been published called *Early Modern Knowledge Societies as Affective Economies* which is a book of essays about the intersections of cultural history, history of knowledge, economic history, and the history of emotions. There are about ten essays in the book and I have an essay in it about the Arctic. The second of these co-editing adventures is about to be published in April from Princeton and is called *Concophilia* which details collecting shells in the early modern period. But my main project is a study of political culture through the lens of the commemoration and remembrance of an event that happened in 1596-1597 when there was a Dutch attempt to sail through the Arctic Circle to get to China. But the ship gets stuck in the ice near Nova Zembla and the sailors have to spend the winter there in the arctic without aid! By the end of the ordeal, 13 out of 17 of the sailors survived. It was a failed expedition, but many became fascinated with the journey and one of the survivors published a best-selling account of the experience in 1598. It remains a topic of interest for the Dutch and I'm interested in how this expedition is remembered in different times, right up to the modern era. So it encompasses looking at the Netherlands in the 1590s and the cultural history or cultural brew that was present such as new merchants, cartography, money exchange. Then going on into later centuries, it becomes a manner in how the Dutch define themselves. Even today, there's a big debate in the Netherlands and Dutch politics about how the Dutch should view their history and themselves in the face of anti-colonialist attitudes. So, it's a project that I love working on.

In “Cultural History of Early Modern Europe”, the course I took with you last fall, the reading material consisted of, in part, microhistories. How would you define “microhistory” to someone who has never been exposed to one before?

First, microhistory isn't a school of history but a form to write history. The practice really took off during the 1970s when the first microhistory came out which was Carlo Ginzburg's *The Cheese and the Worms*. There are, actually, a couple different ways a microhistory can be defined. There's the Italian definition and then everyone else's definition. The basic foundation of a microhistory is that it is taking a story, sometimes the story of a person and people, in order to think about bigger themes within the historical context. Historians can complete microhistories in article form, but it's particularly done in short book form. Peter Lake, who teaches at Vanderbilt University now, taught a course at Princeton called, "Short Silly Books of Early Modern Europe". He meant microhistories and they're not really silly. You can glean a lot of vital information to understand a certain time period. So Natalie Zemon Davis' *The Return of Martin Guerre* tells the story of how a man impersonated another man and lived with that man's wife. In doing so, Davis is able to study the village politics, cultural practices, and other historical aspects of early modern France. That's the key to doing microhistories; being able to extrapolate bigger themes from a small story that concerns common people sometimes.

What makes microhistories so powerful in teaching history?

I have always been a huge advocate of microhistories and teaching microhistories. Of course a powerful tool of microhistories is that they are extremely fun to read which makes students want to read them. More than that, microhistories are an effective way to think about big themes. You always have to maintain in your mind what the big themes are while you're doing the work. The themes of an historical era may not be apparent for some students, but microhistories allow for those themes to be seen in application rather than simply principle. So, being able to extract those big themes through studying a microcosm while having fun with it is invaluable.

While microhistories are powerful, do you believe there to be downsides to microhistories?

This is a big debate between historians and the historiography of microhistories. Is the event that's being studied typical? Can this event even reflect anything bigger that can be studied and if it doesn't does it even matter? In Ginzburg's *The Cheese and the Worms*, an Italian miller is accused of heresy by the Church and is tried twice. What's interesting is Ginzburg says that the story may not be typical of the era. Even if its not, the book is still a masterpiece. Then there's the debate with the Italian School of Microhistory who contend that you don't have to extract a bigger theme from the story being analyzed! The Italians contend that the main point is simply telling the story in order to understand that real history happens at the ground level in villages and not necessarily, all the time, in palaces. So, whoever writes a microhistory needs to prepare themselves for strong critiques. Other scholars will often question the need or the importance of studying the events of a small French village or Italian monastery in the 1600s. A large "downside" would be the skeptical questions that arise whenever a microhistory is published.

One of the wonderful things about microhistories is that they can appeal to a wider swath of people outside of academia. Do you believe it to be a good goal of historians to attempt to reach out to people who may not have studied history or should historians try to stay in the academic world with microhistories and their work?

It's always a good thing to write for a bigger audience and attempt to explain complex historical theories to people who may not have been exposed to them. A historian should try to think of different manners in which to reach people outside of the immediate discipline and it's very beneficial for everyone involved. I've done it through television, interviews, and of course, writing to reach out and tell people that history just isn't a list of dates to be memorized. My book *Tulipmania* was very academic but I

utilized television, interviews, and even social media to connect with a general audience who just want to know more about the event and era. Of course, some historical work may be very dense and academic such as intense economic histories. Economic histories give us very vital information, but it may not be appealing to certain people outside of the discipline and that's fine. Nonetheless, people like stories! Stories are something that historians are well-equipped to tell and historians should be open to telling those stories to anyone who is willing to listen. I would advise any aspiring historian to mix it up and do both if they wish, which will make their work more fulfilling.

THE SCROLL

VOL
==

ISS
—

USC Dornsife
Department of History